For it is pointless to affect indifference with respect to such [metaphysical] inquiries, to whose object human nature cannot be indifferent. Moreover, however much they may think to make themselves unrecognizable by exchanging the language of the schools for a popular style, these so-called indifferentists, to the extent that they think anything at all, always unavoidably fall back into metaphysical assertions, which they yet professed so much to despise. 1 In a recent article, Aaron Ridley, a notable philosopher of music, attacks the study of musical ontology. 2 His conclusions range in strength from the claim that musical ontology is 'absolutely worthless' (203) to the suggestion that 'in musical aesthetics, ontology comes last (at the end of time, perhaps)' (215). As someone who works in the field of musical ontology, these claims strike me as wrong. I feel some obligation, then, to defend the practice of musical ontology -of trying to describe the kinds of musical things there are, and the relations that hold between them. I think the best way to be convinced of the value of musical ontology is to read some. To that end, all I can do here is direct readers elsewhere. But I will also dispatch Ridley's negative arguments and say something about the benefits and limits of musical ontology.
I. CONTRA RIDLEY
Ridley's strategy is as follows. He first argues that musical ontology has no consequences for musical aesthetics or practice, and that no one is in fact, or should be, puzzled by questions of musical ontology. (By 'musical aesthetics' he seems to mean the study of questions of musical value.) From this he concludes that no one should engage in debate over questions of musical ontology. He then argues, contrary to musical ontologists'
claims that answering questions of value requires an ontological theory, or at least ontological assumptions, that in fact the reverse holds: the ontological facts about music depend on facts about its value. Thus the ontologist cannot defend herself by claiming only to be doing musical metaphysics, divorcing her inquiry from questions of value.
I will argue against each of Ridley's claims, in reverse order. First, I will show that Ridley's main argument about the relationship between musical ontology and value fails, since it equivocates on the notion of the 'content' of a musical work. Second, I will
show that his subsidiary argument -that musical ontology is not worth doing since genuine ontological questions never arise in musical practice or aesthetics -does not succeed, and that Ridley fails even to keep controversial ontological assumptions out of his own article. Third, I will show how the ontology of music can have important consequences for questions of musical value, though a much more concrete case is made for this conclusion by actual studies in musical ontology than by my abstract arguments here.
Ontology and content
Ridley's argument against doing musical ontology independently of, or even prior to, musical value theory is the following.
[A] performance of a work cannot be 'faithful' to it unless it evinces an understanding of it. And if a performance's faithfulness is, minimally, a matter of the understanding it shows, then a performance is, in that much, to be valued in proportion to the richness, depth, insight, subtlety and so on of the understanding it evinces. But if this is right, evidently enough, much of the 'content' of a given work is only revealed in the understandings that faithful performances of it evince. And that means that any attempt to specify that content -the content to which a good performance is faithful -in advance of evaluative judgements about argues that three necessary conditions jointly suffice for a performance's being of a particular work: '(1) the performance matches the work's content, more or less; (2) the performers intend to follow most of the instructions specifying the work, whoever wrote them; and (3) a robust causal chain runs from the performance to the work's creation'. 4 In a later article on profundity in instrumental music, Davies puts on his musicologist's 5 hat to give an analysis of the first movement of Bartók's Music for Strings, Percussion, and Celesta. The analysis ends with the following paragraph:
Here is the miracle. The closing three measures not only draw the movement to its close, they recapitulate and thereby summarize the whole movement's structure.
The two voices move in contrary motion from A, settle simultaneously on E-flat, the tritone, and then reverse the process until they converge in unison on the final A. (It does not follow that the work does not have that content in advance of those interpretations, but I ignore this issue here.) In another sense of content, though -that which we would use to check whether we had a faithful copy of the text (in the ordinary sense of 'faithful') -clearly we could know the content of the work in advance of any interpretations of it. Given enough time, I could tell you whether you have a faithful copy of Finnegans Wake, though I have next to no understanding of that work. 6 
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Once we have sorted out these senses of content, we can read Ridley's argument in two ways. The charitable reading is to use the deep sense of content, or meaning, in which case the conclusion is that any attempt to specify the content of a work in advance of a good interpretation of it would be futile. I say 'good interpretation' rather than 'faithful performance' because (i) as noted above, Ridley uses 'faithful' in a non-standard way, and (ii) he includes among performances those 'in one's head', which makes his denial of the possibility of achieving an understanding of a work in advance of hearing a performance of it more plausible. 7 On this reading, Ridley's argument seems defensible, if trivial. The drawback is that on this reading the argument fails to connect with Ridley's main concerns in his article, for 'content', in the sense being used, is not the kind of thing musical ontologists describe. In order to reach the strong conclusion about musical ontology Ridley is aiming for, we must read 'faithful performance' more literally, and
give 'content' its shallower meaning of just what would determine whether or not we have a performance of the work. But on this reading, the argument is indefensible, for the reasons given above -anyone with access to a copy of the score and the ability to read it can tell you to a large extent the content a performance would need to have were it to be a performance of this work. 8 
Aesthetics without ontology?
A second argument Ridley employs is that we are never genuinely confused or puzzled about the ontology of the music we listen to, so there is no point in theorizing about it. This sounds extremely odd coming from a philosopher. Whoever 'we' is supposed to refer to here, it must exclude musical ontologists, since they will certainly claim to be puzzled, and perhaps even confused, about the ontology of the music they are listening 
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The idea is that we can do all of musical aesthetics in this ontologically neutral mode. Whatever they are, they are clearly not neutral, pre-theoretical assumptions that no ontologist could possibly object to.
Ontology and value
Thus far I have shown that Ridley's two main arguments for the thesis that we should abandon musical ontology are unsound. We need not rely on value judgments about a particular performance to determine whether or not it is a performance of a particular work, nor is it the case that questions of musical ontology do not arise for a philosophically-minded person interested in music. Moreover, Ridley himself has failed to write his article using only neutral, pre-theoretical assumptions about musical ontology. Perhaps Ridley's negative arguments can be strengthened, but rather than attempt that here, I prefer to provide a positive argument for the relevance of ontological considerations to judgments of musical value. If musical value judgments presuppose ontological judgments, then Ridley's arguments must fail. angles to each other, and so forth.
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It so happens that sharp, jagged guernicas are dynamic and vital, expressive of anger, violence, and so on, while rolling guernicas are smooth, soft, and gentle. 14 The shapes that we see in Picasso's 'Guernica' do not play any more expressive or representational role in guernicas than the flatness of the canvas does in (our) paintings. Clearly, if someone who knew nothing about painting, but a lot about guernicas, saw Picasso's 'Guernica', they would (erroneously taking it to be a guernica) describe it as 'cold, stark, lifeless, or serene and restful, or perhaps bland, dull, boring -but in any case not violent, dynamic, and vital'. 15 The people from the alien culture would misdescribe Picasso's work, because they would take it to be of a kind of which it is not. This sort of misdescription could easily result in a misevaluation. (Perhaps flat guernicas were all the rage in the '60s, but everyone is just so over them now.)
Walton gives a parallel argument in a musical idiom in a later essay. 16 Here, he asks us to imagine a Martian musical tradition. Ridley is listening to, why the anger? Apparently because it is such a bad performance.
But would such rage result from even the most appalling imaginable live performance of the symphony by a full orchestra? I suspect not. Part of the reason for this is that the Ode to Joy theme is quite unremarkable. 21 It is a commonplace in analyses of the Ninth Symphony that the theme that emerges low in the strings, early in the final movement, from the detritus of the preceding three movements, seems far too slight to bear the weight of this great symphony to its conclusion. One of the remarkable things about the work is that Beethoven shows these appearances to be deceiving. The greatness of the Ninth (or even its fourth movement) was surely not simply lying in wait in the Ode to Joy theme, to be discovered by any nineteenth-century composer with a reasonable grasp of harmony, counterpoint, and orchestration. Thus, part of what explains Ridley's despair at the muzak'd Ode is that it untimely rips the theme from the context that makes it part of something great. 22 There is another kind of case in which ontological confusion results in evaluative mistakes. There may develop two musical traditions that display many similarities, yet are ontologically quite different. The traditions may share roughly the same harmonic and melodic language, for instance, but one may be a tradition of live performances of enduring works, while another is centrally improvisatory. In such cases, it will be tempting to judge performances in the two traditions on the same grounds, since the same kinds of descriptive musicological judgments may apply to performances in both traditions. But evaluative judgments will not follow automatically from such descriptions.
It is difficult to write a good fugue, which is part of the reason why good fugues, and performances of them, are valued. But it is even more difficult to improvise a good fugue, and thus we tend to value equally good, but improvised, performances of fugues even more highly than those of 'pre-composed' fugues. If someone does not recognize that a certain performance is improvised, but rather assumes that it is a performance of a composed work, she will tend to undervalue the performance. Thus, approaching an improvisatory tradition as if it were one of composed works will result in thoroughgoing misevaluation.
It is this sort of ontological confusion that ontologists of rock and jazz music are attempting to untangle. 26 For instance, in my view, rock music is centrally an artform in which recordings are the works of art, unlike Western classical music, which is a tradition wherein works are for performance, while in jazz there are no works, only performances.
There is no space here to defend these particular views, but it should be clear that if they are correct there will be implications for evaluative judgments of these kinds of music.
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III. SOME LIMITS OF MUSICAL ONTOLOGY
While I do not think Ridley's arguments are sound, I do accept two theses about musical ontology that might be considered much milder versions of some of the claims he makes, though I accept them for somewhat different reasons. The distance between his claims and mine can be gauged from the fact that while his imply that musical ontology should be abandoned, mine merely describe some limits on musical ontology.
The first thesis can be seen as taking the hyperbole out of what for Ridley is a concession -that perhaps musical ontology can be done 'at the end of time' (215). One thing that most musical ontologists (and ontologists of art in general) accept is that, whatever the status of general metaphysics, musical (and art) ontology is descriptive. 28 This is less controversial in musical ontology than in general metaphysics because music is a human practice, and thus it is less controversial that the objects of inquiry in musical 33 and even the odd eliminativist. 34 Recently, the consensus has favoured realism -the view that musical works are abstract objects -with the central dispute being whether or not such abstracta can be created. 35 This debate, it seems to me, might be more fairly characterized as 'musical metaphysics' than the debate over the conditions on work performances that Ridley fixes upon, since it is independent of most,
if not all, questions of musical value. 36 Just as any solution to the problem of universals must make some sense of our claims that two cakes have the same shape, any solution to the question of the fundamental nature of a musical work must make some sense of our claims that two performances are of the same work. Thus, any evaluative questions that hang on the latter issue will not trickle down to the more fundamental metaphysical debate. 37 Finally, it is worth mentioning again the growing interest in comparative ontology. Recent work on the ontology of rock, jazz, and non-Western music, like the debate over the conditions on a work performance, takes for granted that some sense can be made of repeatable musical objects. The debate is rather about the roles those objects play in the musical practice in question. Is a rock recording some sort of representation of a work-performance, like a classical recording, or is it a work of art in its own right? This sort of question is clearly related to questions of musical value in two ways. First, in order to answer the question, one must look at the musical practice involved, including evaluative practices. If recordings are given primacy of place in the rock tradition, then that is one reason in favour of considering them to be works. Second, as mentioned above, part of the motivation for addressing these issues in the first place is putative evaluative errors that have been made in part on the basis of a misunderstanding of the ontology of the music involved.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Aaron Ridley's arguments that musical ontology is worthless are unsound. There are genuinely puzzling ontological questions about music, many of which are closely related to questions of musical value. While it is true that musical ontology must be descriptive of pre-existing musical practices and that some debates, such as that over the creatability of musical works, have little consequence for questions of musical value, none of this implies that these debates themselves are without value. 38 Andrew Kania, Department of Philosophy, Trinity University, One Trinity Place, San
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